Virtue, Practice, and Perplexity in Plato’s m Wians – – Plato: The Internet Journal of the International Plato Society (Plato 12 ()). Dominic Scott has produced a monograph on the Meno that in its fluency and succinctness does justice to its subject and, like its subject. Buy [(Plato’s Meno)] [Author: Dominic Scott] published on (March, ) by Dominic Scott (ISBN:) from Amazon’s Book Store. Everyday low prices and free.

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Plato – – Cambridge University Press. Here, too, Scott is aware of the problem but simply asserts that we should not expect them to be the same domonic. Moreover, the numbing effect need not be paralyzing: Perhaps the reason he resists this further application is that the only thing he regards as genuine virtue is ruling others and having power and money, and not whatever it is that women, old men, children, and slaves might have that goes by that name. Scott’s analysis illuminates several of the Meno ‘s puzzles.

Does sscott demonstration not in fact suggest that, in the absence of a teacher who knows, recollection is insufficient to yield knowledge, yet that recollection is hardly needed at all if such a teacher is present? Bluck – – Journal of Hellenic Meo Monthly downloads Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

Yet Plato seems consistently to place the blame for the impasse on Socrates’ intransigent interlocutors rather than on their examiner.

In the four cases of Socrates on trial that Plafo deals with, the assumptions attributed to the historical Socrates are, respectively, the unitarian assumption, the notion that the elenchus is beneficial, our duty to inquire, and the thesis that soctt should discover what virtue is before we examine whether it is teachable.

One should at least entertain the possibility that Socrates’ playing of the character card at this point is meant to say more about him than about Meno. Landry – – Philosophia Mathematica 20 2: Nor, on the other hand, is Meno particularly stupid or badly behaved, though he would need to be for Scott to succeed in portraying him as failing to grasp the import of his own contributions.

By “Socratic” here Scott is clear that he means what pertains to that elusive figure, the historical Socrates. A more forceful objection on Plato’s part might be that elenctic investigation is hopeless–at least if its aim is to produce knowledge. Thus in none of the four examples of challenges to Socratic assumptions that he identifies does Scott seem to me to make a convincing case for regarding Meno as displaying significant moral or intellectual deficiencies as an interlocutor.



This book confronts the dialogue’s many enigmas and attempts to solve them in a way that is both lucid and sympathetic to Plato’s philosophy.

Dominic Scott – – Cambridge University Press.

Scott contends that once Socrates takes up the question of virtue’s teachability, Meno shows signs of having improved: On xcott issues, he strikes out boldly on his own. The Meno of Plato R.

This article has no associated abstract. His previous publications include Recollection and Experience: It is no straightforward exercise to extract the views of the historical Socrates from the Platonic dramatizations and fictionalizations of Socratic conversations.

One Virtue or Many? What evidence does Scott provide to support his contention that the historical Socrates espoused such positions? The root of the problem is, again, Scott’s strategy of attempting to read the dialogue as operating on two levels. The following are some questions that would need to be answered before we could quite so sanguinely take at face value Socrates’ recollection theory and its implicit “foreknowledge” assumption.

Recollection and the Mathematician’s Method in Plato’s Meno. Dominic Scott’s contribution to the McCabe series of commentaries on Platonic dialogues is a most welcome addition to that still short but fine list.

But even if this critique is apt, it is hard to see what alternatives to elenchus Socrates has–if indeed he is as lacking in wisdom as he claims to be. Otherwise, it makes no sense to speak of the dialogue operating at two levels. That being so, can we be certain that Socrates’ criticism of Meno is straightforwardly endorsed by Plato? It seems to me more natural to see this as a sign not of resentment on Meno’s part but a kind of amazed bewilderment that characterizes the stingray speech as a whole — this is surely the force of his prediction that Socrates might be arrested “as a wizard” 80b6 should he leave Athens.

Kerferd – – The Classical Review 13 Scott has written very much in this spirit, and I would like to focus here on two related aspects of the way he sees continuity within the dialogue. But if Plato’s criticism of Socrates amounts to little more than that Socratic inquiry is not always beneficial, that it is at times even counterproductive, it is hardly new to the Meno. He has thereby given us a fine example of what writing about the Meno should look like, one that will have appeal to a wide readership, sophisticated and otherwise.


Edited with Introduction and Commentary.

Plato’s Meno // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame

Request removal from index. First, according to Aristotle, as well as to a widespread soctt fairly standard reading of Plato’s Theory of Forms, Plato himself subscribes platk this principle. The book concludes with three appendices, the first concerned with the compatibility of Meno 77bb with Rep. For Socrates, even that good that is most widely agreed to be his ultimate good, happiness, is nevertheless “profitable”: We have indeed seen instances where Meno is pleased to continue the discussion so long as Socrates gives him what he wants–for example, a definition of color that he scotr see 77a; for other instances of his agreeableness when not confronted see 76d, 81a7, a9.

No keywords specified fix it. Scott’s clear analysis and considered judgments illuminate previously dark corners of the dialogue.

Are we to think that Plato sides with Meno in this instance, believing him to have a legitimate complaint against Socrates? Yet Meno is in live dialogue — is it really obtuse of him not to dive in straightaway?

Dominic Scott: Plato’s Meno. – Free Online Library

In the main sections of the dialogue where Scott detects Socrates being put on philosophical trial, Meno’s own character is variously “undisciplined … obtuse … resentful … and obstructive” — quite a litany. Indeed one wonders why Meno would ask the question in the first place in his “peremptory” fashion if not because he regards it as of pressing practical importance.

Virtue, Practice, and Perplexity in Plato’s Meno. Grube – – New York: Books Available for Review. As far as 4 is concerned, might it not be that Socrates insists on the priority of definition because asking for a definition is the best way to elicit the views and commitments of his interlocutors?